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taken a narrow view of the types of probationary conditions which are 
unduly harsh and has thereby effectively limited the lower court's 
discretion in determining a proper remedy. However, the determination 
that the Federal Probation Act is applicable to corporations remains as 
a previously unexplored means of dealing with a complex and unusual 
type of criminal. Although the Atlantic Richfield court dismissed with 
disappointing brevity the issues of probation conditions more onerous 
than sentence and a defendant's right to refuse probation, the use of 
probation to control the corporate entity is a significant idea worthy of 
further use and development by the jUdiciary. A comprehensive view of 
the Federal Probation Act which encompasses restitution by the crimi-
nal to aggrieved parties, supervision of the criminal by the courts, and 
the eventual reformation of the criminal into a positive member of 
society logically includes the violations of the corporate entity. As long 
as other means of dealing with the illegal acts of corporations remain 
ineffective, the use of probation deserves further development. 
Rignal W. Baldwin 
COPYRIGHT-EXTENSIVE PHOTODUPLICATION OF COpy-
RIGHTED SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS BY LIBRARIES DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. WILLIAMS & WIL-
KINS CO. V. UNITED STATES, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
The speed and ease of reproduction by modern photoduplication 
equipment has resulted in. an increase in reproduction which has posed 
a problem to copyright holders. Photocopying diminishes the need for 
the original work and impairs the protection afforded the owner of the 
copyright. It poses a growing threat to the balance between the 
constitutional right of the people to the free dissemination of 
information' and the statutory right of the copyright holder to control 
the use of his work. 2 Unfortunately, the present copyright ace is vague 
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 provides: 
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective writings and Discoveries. 
2. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) et. seq. (1970). 
3. [d. The present Copyright Act was originally adopted in 1909. Since that time several 
attempts at revision have been made beginning with the amendments proposed before the 
Berne Convention in 1924. The Dallinger, Perkins and Vestal Bills were efforts to adhere to 
the Berne Convention, as a result of which copyright protection was extended to the 
motion picture industry. Following three more revisionary bills from 1931-39, and 
amendments in accord with the 1954 Universal Copyright Convention, the Copyright Act 
is still silent on what types and scope of copying, if any, do not constitute copyright 
infringement. For the legislative history of U.S. copyright law see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
FROM 1901 to 1954, S. Res. 53, Study No.1, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-19 (1960). 
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on the rights and privileges of the parties in this situation. Therefore, 
until statutory clarification is effected, the issue must be settled by the 
courts. The first case to challenge massive reproduction of copyrighted 
material is Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. 4 
The Williams & Wilkins Co. (W & W) was a major publisher of 
medical journals, four of which were the subject of this action. The 
articles in these journals were submitted individually by their authors in 
manuscript form to W & W who compiled them into journal issues and 
distributed the journals by subscription. Because of the esoteric nature 
of the journals, they commanded a very limited reading public. s Most 
of the revenue received from these journals came from subscriptions. 
Notice of W & W's copyright appeared at the beginning of every issue 
and occasionally preceded the individual articles. Co-defendants, the 
National Institute of Health (NIH) and the National Library of 
Medicine (NLM), were two of W & W's subscribers. NIH maintained a 
large technical library that, while used primarily by NIH researchers, 
was also available to the public. The Library had an extensive 
photocopying service for the benefit of the NIH staff. The library's 
policy was to reproduce only a single copy of an article per request, and 
only one article per journal issue. Exceptions to this policy were 
routinely made as long as substantially less than an entire journal issue 
was copied. The library received a sizable photocopy budget from the 
federal government and accordingly did not charge the consumer for 
the material copied. 
The National Library of Medicine was established by Congress "to 
aid the dissemination and exchange of scientific and other information 
important to the progress of medicine and the public health .... "6 It 
participated in an interlibrary loan program and, like NIH, maintained a 
policy of furnishing only one copy of an article per request and 
substantially less than an entire journal issue on any given request. 
NLM, like NIH, made exceptions to their rule. It was also the policy of 
NLM not to copy articles from journals which were on a "readily 
available list" (on which list plaintiff's journals appeared) or articles 
published within the past five years (the oldest of plaintiff's articles at 
the time of photoduplication was twenty-two months). Again, 
exceptions were routinely made. NLM's consumers included commer-
cial organizations, particularly drug companies, as well as students, 
universities, medical schools, and other libraries. 7 
The Williams & Wilkins Co. alleged that the defendant's procedure 
for photoduplicating its articles was wholesale copying and constituted 
4. 487 F.2d 1345 (1973); petition for cert. filed, (U.S., Feb. 20, 1974) (No. 73-1279). 
5. The most widely-subscribed to journal of the group in contest here is Gastroenterology, 
which is perhaps the leading journal on the subject in the world. It commands a 
subscription list of only about 7,000. 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 275 (1970). 
7. In 1970 N.I.H. photocopied an estimated 93,000 articles and L.L.M. filled about 120,000 
requests for photocopied articles. These copies included plaintiffs articles. 
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copyright infringement.8 The Commissioner of the Court of Claims 
upheld this claim, but was reversed on appeal in a 4-3 decision in favor 
of the United States.9 
The question in this case was did NIH and NLM infringe upon the 
copyright of W & W's medical journals by reproducing articles for third 
persons without the permission of W & W? The difficulty in the 
determination of that issue was that not every use of a copyrighted 
material without the holder's permission constitutes infringement. I 0 
Whether the use is excused depends upon the court's interpretation of 
the circumstances of a given case in light of legal precedent. I I Courts 
have been guided by such factors as the amount of the taking, how 
much the reproduction satisfies the need for the original, the use to 
which the copy is put, the potential loss to the copyright holder, and 
the nature of the material copied. I 2 When these factors weighed in 
favor of the copier, the courts have ruled the taking a "fair use" and 
relieved the copier of infringement liability. I 3 But this formula is an 
oversimplification of the doctrine of fair use as the application of each 
factor to the facts of a case, or a body of cases, is not easily 
accomplished. How much is too much, what relative weight should be 
given each factor, and which factors come to bear on the propriety of a 
use are considerations which have caused Congress to avoid the issue of 
fair use and bewildered the courts in copyright cases. I 4 
The application of "fair use" to library reproduction of copyrighted 
material is in need of resolution. I 5 The court in the Williams & Wilkins 
case recognized this need in what it called a "ground-breaking copyright 
infringement action ... against the United States of America."16 It 
carefully analyzed the history of copyright law, its roots in the United 
States Constitution as a safeguard of the public's right to free 
dissemination of information, and the gradual development of the 
doctrine of fair use. The court synthesized the evidence and made a 
determination that massive photocopying by libraries of copyrighted 
scientific journals without the owner's permission did not constitute 
copyright infringement. The majority opinion was heavily influenced 
by the fact that the subject matter was scientific. I 7 The court reasoned 
8. This action was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1970). Prior to 1960 this section 
provided for only patent actions to be brought against the United States. Pursuant to the 
Copyright Act, it was amended to include actions against the U.S. for monetary damages 
for copyright infringement. 
9. Judges Skelton, Kashiwa and Bennett joined in the extensive majority opinion written by 
Judge Davis. The dissent, written by Chief Judge Cowan and joined in by Judge Kunzig, 
was equally in·depth and comprehensive. Judge Nichols wrote an independent dissent. 
10. Loew's. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 
1955); Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941). 
11. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174 (S.D. Cal. 1955). 
12. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943). 
13. M. B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 145 at 645-48 (1972 ed.). 
14. [d. at 643. See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at 1363. 
15. Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks. and Copyrights of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Statements at 92-97 (1973). 
16. 487 F.2d at 1346. 
17. [d. at 1357, 1358, 1359. 
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that the free and unobstructed dissemination of scientific information 
more adequately advanced the constitutional right of the people to 
receive the benefit from such scientific information than did the strict 
enforcement of the plaintiff's copyright.! 8 This, coupled with the fact 
that NIH and NLM received no profit from the copies, gave the court 
justification to determine that the use made was fair in spite of the fact 
that an entire, verbatim copy was made.! 9 
Evidently aware of the widespread implications of its opinion and 
apprehensive of the possible limitations of the factual situation in 
Williams & Wilkins, the court retreated in the last paragraphs of its 
opinion and refused to establish a hard and fast rule. The court said 
that Williams & Wilkins was to be cited as no more than an 
interpretation of the particular facts of that case.2 0 The court 
expressed the hope that the opinion would serve as a "holding 
operation"2! until the legislature assumes the responsibility of 
definition in this area, a duty which it has avoided since 1909. 
Various tests of "fair use" have been employed to determine whether 
the taking was substantia1.22 A "Gentlemen's Agreement" between 
publishers and consumers, discussed in the Williams & Wilkins dissent, 
included a qualification on copying which stipulated that the taking 
must not be so substantial as to constitute infringement. 
While the right of quotation without permission is not 
provided in law, the courts have recognized the right to a "fair 
use" of book quotations, the length of a "fair" quotation being 
dependent upon the type of work quoted from and the 
"fairness" to the author's interest. Extensive quotation is 
obviously inimical to the author's interest * * * It would not be 
fair to the author or publisher to make possible the substitution 
of the photostats for the purchase of a copy of the book itself 
either for an individual library or for any permanent collection 
in a public or research library. Orders for photocopying which, 
by reason of their extensiveness or for any other reasons, violate 
this principle should not be accepted. 2 3 
The dissenters agreed that there can be no evaluation of the elements of 
fair use if the copying is of an entire work. Therefore, they refused to 
consider the facts that the subject matter in Williams & Wilkins was 
scientific, that the defendants made no profit from the copying, and 
18. [d. at 1359. 
19. [d. at 1354. 
20. [d. at 1362. 
21. [d. at 1363. 
22. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 303-04 (E.D. Pa. 
1938). 
23. 487 F.2d at 1379-80. The "Gentlemen's Agreement" was drafted in 1935 as a result of 
meetings between libraries and various members of the publishing industry. While it does 
not have the effect of law and has never been involved in judicial proceedings, it is 
indicative of what is reasonable and customary in the field. 
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that the plaintiff failed to prove actual damages. These are irrelevant 
factors when the discussion is one of "wholesale copying.,,2 4 
In spite of the court's reluctance to establish a concrete and uniform 
ruling which would unambiguously extend the traditional protection of 
the copyright holder to mass photoduplication, the decision in Williams 
& Wilkins is a landmark in copyright law, and the error of that decision 
should be examined. 
The court erred in investigating the factors relating to fair use, since a 
substantial taking of an entire work precludes fair use. Different 
amounts of copying are allowed by the courts in different circum-
stances. If the material copied is scientific or educational, for example, 
the courts have applied a liberal standard to how much can be copied 
before infringement occurs.2 5 If the entire work is copied, however, as 
was the case in Williams & Wilkins, the surrounding circumstances are 
irrelevant. "Wholesale" copying can never be fair use. 2 6 
Copyright protection did not exist at common law. 2 7 The author 
had a property right in his unpublished work, but once the work was 
published, that right was lost and the work entered into the public 
domain.28 The copyright protection which exists today is purely 
statutory.29 Both parties to the action in Williams & Wilkins agreed 
that the interpretation of that statute must be based on the purpose of 
the constitutional provision empowering Congress to enact the law. 3 0 
The purpose in granting copyright protection is "[t] 0 promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts .... "3 1 To implement that end the 
courts "must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in 
a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the 
development of art, science, and industry.,,3 2 It has been suggested 
that the limitation of fair use on the statutory privilege of the copyright 
holder is based on the first and ninth amendments to the Constitu-
tion.33 The constitutional argument is that the first amendment right 
of the American people to freedom of speech coupled with their ninth 
24. 487 F.2d at 1366. 
25. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
26. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484,486 (9th Cir. 1937). 
27. Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L. Cas. 815, 24 L.J. Ex. 81 (1854). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 214 (1954). 
28. Bobbs·Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
29. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970). 
30. Cf, Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). The Constitutional 
provision empowering Congress to enact a copyright statute is cited supra note 1. 
31. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943). Some courts have 
stated that any reward to the copyright holder which is precipitated by the statutory 
protection is secondary to the main consideration of encouragement of the production of of 
literary works. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
32. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964). 
33. Brief for Nat'l Educ. Ass'n as Amicus Curae at 16-17, 31-34, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
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amendment right to free dissemination of information reduce the 
copyright holder's protection to a privilege granted in the interest of 
furthering the constitutional right of the people. The reasoning is that 
copyright protection will encourage authors to disseminate their 
information so "that the world may not be deprived of improvements, 
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.,,3 4 In no case, however, is the 
encouragement of the author to frustrate the very purpose for which it 
exists, to afford the people free and unobstructed access to 
information.3s 
The defendant in Williams & WilI,ins used the above argument to 
indicate that the public right to the information in the journals is more 
dependent upon the photocopying service they provide than it is on the 
protection of plaintiff's copyright.3 6 While it cannot be denied that the 
purpose of copyright protection is to further the sciences and the arts, 
the approach of the majority opinion will limit the flow of information 
to the public. Free and unobstructed dissemination of copyrighted 
information is as dependent upon the publisher's profit in printing it as 
it is upon the author's decision to release it. The legislative purpose of 
copyright law is to encourage authors and publishers to release their 
work so that the people have access to information, pursuant to their 
constitutional right.37 It is difficult to imagine how a publisher of 
medical journals cannot be involved in the "development of art, science 
and industry,"3 8 nor how the American people can avail themselves of 
their right to access without his services. It is only reasonable, 
therefore, that a publisher be sufficiently compensated for those 
services, so that he may continue profitably to publish the information 
to which the people have a constitutional right. In Mazer u. Stein, Mr. 
Justice Reed stated: 
"The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to 
the owner a secondary consideration." However, it is "intended 
definitely to grant valuable enforceable rights to authors, 
publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford 
greater encouragement to the production of literary (or artistic) 
works of lasting benefit to the world.,,3 9 
The cases which have addressed themselves to the constitutional 
purpose for copyright law have done so predominantly in support of 
34. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co .. 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 
1938). 
35. Brief for Nat'\. Educ. Ass'n as Amicus Curae at 10, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 487 F .2d 1345 (1973). 
36. Brief for Defendant at 29, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 
(1972). 
37. Brief for Nat'\. Educ. Ass'n as Amicus Curae at 53, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 487 F .2d 1345 (1973). 
38. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964). 
39. 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (citations omitted). 
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their decision to uphold the defense of fair use.40 In those cases, the 
issue was the substantiality of the taking. The doctrine of "fair use" 
itself has been described as a judicial attempt "to bring some order out 
of the confusion surrounding the question of how much can be cop-
ied."4 I In an effort to define when the defense of fair use is appropri-
ate for examination, the courts have adopted a policy consistent with 
the constitutional argument. In general, when the taking is for the 
furtherance of the sciences or the arts, a broader range of use will be 
allowed in the evaluation of substantiality than will be allowed for 
commercial uses.4 2 
In Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco CO.,43 where a 
tobacco company used three lines of a copyrighted medical book in an 
advertisement, the court finding infringement, ruled that to be a 
substantial taking the material used need not be the whole of even a 
large part thereof. The court recognized the broader scope given to 
substantiality in the case of scientific works, but declined to place the 
defendant's advertisement in that category. The court stated that 
neither the innocent intent of the defendant nor his acknowledgement 
of the authorship of the sentences used would be a valid defense where 
the taking was sUbstantial.4 4 
In Hill v. Whalen & Martel,4 5 which dealt with the infringing use of 
cartoon characters obviously resembling the copyrighted Mutt and Jeff 
figures, the court used as its test of fair use "whether or not so much has 
been reproduced as will materially reduce the demand for the 
original.'>4 6 That court reasoned that if the copied work could 
effectively replace the original, injury must logically result to the 
copyright holder, giving him an action for infringement. Infringement 
40. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House. Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(defendant's insubstantial use of biographic information about Howard Hughes. some of 
which defendant's author used in·production of his book on Hughes held protected); Berlin 
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) (use of same meter but not lyrics as 
plaintiffs song in a parody created by defendant, allowed); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. 
Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (defendant's insubstantial taking held not to constitute 
infringement in a book concerning a historical figure); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. 
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943) (copying of engineering sketches from 
plaintiffs copyrighted catalogue by defendant held too insubstantial to constitute 
infringement) . 
41. 14 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 443,449 (1939) (emphasis added). 
42. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 131 F. Supp. 165, 176 (S.D. Cal. 1955), 
affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally 
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Henry Holt & Co., v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 
F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
43. 23 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
44. [d. Judge Maris also noted that plaintiff was not required to show actual damages as a 
requisite to a judgment in his favor. Id. at 304. The majority opinion in the Williams & 
Wilkins case found the plaintiffs failure to prove actual damages to be influencial in their 
decision. 17 U.S.C § 101 provides in pertinent part: 
[0 Jr in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall ap-
pear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, al-
low the amounts as hereinafter stated .... 
45. 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). 
46. [d. at 360. 
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has been found where the details of a song were substantially similar to 
a copyrighted song,47 and where the intricacies of a copyrighted 
dramatic expression appeared in similar form in a subsequent play.4 8 
Three cases clearly declared that where the taking was considered 
substantial, the doctrine of "fair use" would not apply. In Leon u. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph,49 where the defendant rearranged 
telephone numbers derived from plaintiff's copyrighted directory, the 
court ruled conclusively on the issue of substantial taking. In response 
to the defense of fair use the court said: 
It is not necessary in the case before us to discuss generally 
the question of what constitutes "fair use." Obviously, every 
publication copyrighted admits of many uses which do not 
constitute infringement. Counsel have not disclosed a single 
authority, nor have we been able to find one, which lends any 
support to the proposition that wholesale copying and 
publication of copyrighted material can ever be fair use .... 
The court quoted this statement emphasizing the word "ever" in Benny 
u. Loew's, Inc.,5 0 where Jack Benny asserted the defense of fair use 
due to years of custom in his burlesque television adaptation of the 
play "Gas Light." More recently in Wihtol u. Craw,s I whose facts more 
closely resemble the situation in the Williams & Wilkins case, the court 
refused to define fair use but held that "it is inconceivable ... that the 
copying of all or substantially all, of a copyrighted work can be held to 
be a "fair use" merely because the infringer has no intent to infringe . 
• . • ,,52 In that case, a school music director rearranged the author's 
song for no profit and with no intent to infringe upon the existing 
copyright. He duplicated fifteen copies of the rearrangement which he 
distributed to the students in his choral group. He did the same for the 
Methodist church where he worked. He then wrote to the author asking 
him if he would be interested in receiving a copy, to which letter the 
author responded with an infringement action which was upheld on the 
basis of substantial taking. 
The proposition that fair use is the opposite of substantial taking 
appears easy to apply. However, the difficulty in determining what is 
substantial has led courts to examine other evidence. s 3 The potential 
damage to the sale of the author's work persuaded the court in one 
47. Wihtol v. Wells. 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956). 
48. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 
U.S. 669 (1937). Judge Learned Hand made a distinction between the uncopyrightable 
theme and ideas of a work and the copyrightable expression of those ideas. For a discus-
sion of court rulings on the adaptation of a theme versus the use of an expression see Ship-
man v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938). 
49. 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). 
50. 239 F.2d 532. 536 (9th Cir. 1956). aird by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958). 
51. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1963). 
52. [d. at 780. 
53. M. 8. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 145 at 643-48 (1972 ed.). 
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case,S 4 while the use to which the copy was put was determinative in 
another. s S In Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., S 6 in which the latter 
element was controlling, the court found that the reproduction of the 
chorus of the author's Green Bay Packers theme song in a magazine 
article boosting the Packers was only an "incidental" use of the lines 
copied. The court further stated that they did not compete with the 
song itself, particularly in view of the absence of the music. This last 
consideration seems to amount to a determination of substantial use. 
Combining the elements of potential damage to the author's sales 
with "incidental" use, the court upheld fair use where the satirized 
lyrics of an author's song appeared in a humor magazineS 7 but rejected 
it where a song parody was published in a song sheet. S 8 In the case of 
the former, the parody could not effectively fulfill the demand for the 
original, while in the case of the latter, it could. 
Finally, it has been generally acknowledged that the defense of fair 
use is applicable to literary criticism regardless of how substantial the 
taking is.s 9 This principle has been accepted because the criticism has 
no potential for replacing the demand for the original. In view of the 
fact that the defendants' copying in the Williams & Wilkins case was not 
only substantial, but complete, it would appear that the only possibility 
for a defense of fair use would be an unprecedented extention of the 
literary criticism doctrine to use for research and educational purposes. 
The element threatening this link is the inexhaustable and boundless 
reach of photocopied material which is used entirely as a replacement 
for the original. While this is the first case to be brought in the shadow 
of modern photocopy technology,60 the judicial precedent and 
54. See Public Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for 
insuft. record, 369 U.S. ll1 (1962); Hill v. Whalen & Martell. Inc .. 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 
1914). 
55. Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co .. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941). 
56. [d. 
57. Berlin v. E.C. Publications. Ind., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). 
58. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, Inc., 146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944). 
59. Consumers Union of the United States v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275, 278 
(S.D. N.Y. 1960). 
60. A case involving advanced technology in cable television and its effects on copyright law is 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968). There the Supreme Court held 
that the reception and distribution of television signals by a cable television system did not 
constitute "performance" necessary for copyright infringement. In the recent case, 
Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp .. 94 S.Ct. 859 (1974), the 
Supreme Court again found no copyright infringement by CATV for the reception and 
rebroadcasting of C.B.S. signals. Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that regardless of the 
distance of the original transmitter from the recei\'ing CATV, a broadcast made "public 
for simultaneous viewing" can be received and retransmitted by CATV without infringe-
ment upon the copyright of the original broadcaster. This decision, while not bearing 
directly on massive photoduplication by libraries, shows an inclination of the court to 
favor a public service motive to tbe sacrifice of copyright protection. It is not unlikely that 
such an inclination will prevail against the Williams & Wilkins Co. if the Supreme Court 
grants certiorari. 
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legislative purpose discussed above indicate that the extension of the 
literary criticism exception here seems inappropriate and unlikely. 
In order to apply the argument of substantial taking to preclude the 
defense of fair use in the Williams & Wilkins case, it is necessary to 
determine if an article has the status of a complete copyrightable 
work.6 1 The copyright statute itself, and its interpretation by the 
courts, lends some insight into this determination. The pertinent 
section provides in part: 
The copyright upon component works or periodicals shall give 
to the proprietor thereof all the rights in respect thereto which 
he would have if each part were individually copyrighted under 
this title.6 2 
Because an article is a component "part,,63 of a periodical capable of 
individual copyright protection,64 the test of substantiality is generally 
applied not only to each issue of a periodical but to every article 
therein as wel1.65 This principle is further evidenced when one realizes 
that the author of each manuscript may copyright his work and assign 
both the work and the copyright protection to the publisher, leaving 
the latter with a compilation of individually copyrighted works which 
he may then copyright in its cumulative form. 
Therefore, since the test of substantiality is applicable to individual 
articles and since a substantial taking cannot be fair use, W & W should 
have prevailed. For the Court of Claims to have decided that the 
defendants' use of W & W's copyrighted articles was fair the court had 
to establish anew, and dangerous, precedent that copyright protection 
may be ignored when the copier is non-profit and the material copied is 
scientific. 
The court relied heavily upon the fact that plaintiff showed no actual 
61. Brief for plaintiff at 23, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
62. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). Protection of Component Parts of Works Copyrighted; Composite 
Works or Periodicals: 
The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copyrightable 
component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter therein in which copyright 
is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright. 
The copyright upon composite works or periodicals shall give to the proprietor 
thereof all the rights in respect thereto which he would have if each part were 
individually copyrighted under this title. 
63. See, e.g., King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). 
64. Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953). In this case defendant copied 
nine items of a copyrighted catalogue containing several hundred items. The court 
explained that if each item were not viewed as the subject of its particular copyright, the 
protection of the whole would be meaningless. 206 F.2d at 202. 
65. Hedeman Products Corp. v. Tap-Rite Products. 228 F. Supp. 630, 634 (D.N.J. 1964). 
However. in response to a request for summary judgment, the court refused to rule 
conclusively on the component part issue where the defendant had photocopied the title, 
editorial page masthead and the leading editorial of an issue of the Herald Tribune. New 
York Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
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damages and that a 1962 study found that· pbotocopying had no 
adverse effects on publishers of copyrighted material. 66 The court 
reasoned that since students have traditionally been allowed to take 
notes on entire works or to photocopy a portion thereof for 
themselves, there is no reason not to extend this necessarily limited 
practice to mass and rapid photocopying by libraries upon request}6 7 
The difference, of course, is in the extensiveness of the copying and the 
increased potential that the practice will fulfill the demand of the 
original. In his treatise on copyright, Professor Nimmer pointed out: 
There would appear to be a qualitative difference between each 
individual scholar performing the task of reproduction for 
himself, and the library or other institution performing the task 
on a wholesale basis for all scholars. If the latter is fair use then 
must not the same be said for a non-profit publishing house that 
distributes to scholars unauthorized copies of scientific and 
educational works on a national or international basis?6 8 
The existence of this latter situation, of course, would render all 
copyright law protection completely meaningless with regard to 
scientific or educational works. If such were the case, once the 
protection were eliminated, the purpose for which it was created would 
be eliminated, and the resulting constitutional right would be 
constructively eliminated, all of which would leave scientists and 
scholars in no better position than they were at common law. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion in Williams & Will~ins is clearly erroneous as 
the doctrine of fair use cannot be examined where wholesale taking 
exists. Though the constitutional purpose of the copyright legislation 
has been interpreted to broaden the scope of the taking in the fields of 
science and art, there can be no breadth of taking wide enough to 
justify reproduction of an entire work. The fact that students 
traditionally have hand and machine copied research material, that the 
defendants made no profit from their photocopying services, and that 
plaintiff did not undertake to prove actual damages may be relevant to 
a determination of fair use. However, such a determination is 
inappropriate in the Williams & Wilkins Co. case because the complete 
taking precludes the application of the doctrine.6 9 
66. GEORGE FRY & Assoc., FRY REPORT, SURVEY OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPRODUCTION 
PRACTICES IN SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL FIELDS (1962). For an opposing view see Project-New 
Technology and the Law of Copyright; Reprography and Computers, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 
931 (1968). See also Statement of Mrs. Andrea Albrecht, Director of Marketing Research, 
On Behalf of Williams & Wilkins Co., Hearings of Senate Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 150-53 (1973). 
67. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at 1356. 
68. M.B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 654 (1972 ed.l. 
69. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). 
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Modern technology is continuously presenting new challenges, many 
of which are best met by Congress in their legislative capacity and not 
by the courts. In an early attempt to revise copyright legislation to 
better suit technological advances, Congress received reports on the 
effect of photoduplication of copyrighted material. 70 While drawing no 
conclusions as to the severity or insignificance of the effect, a 
Congressional report suggested several legislative alternatives to the 
photocopying problem. One solution, which works effectively in the 
German Federal Republic and in Austria, is the payment of royalties to 
the publisher of copyrighted materials less than three years 01d. 7 I 
Another alternative, and the one suggested by plaintiff in the present 
case, is licensing of photoduplication rights. Under this scheme the 
subscriber pays a minimal additional amount to the publisher at the 
time of subscription and obtains thereby the right to photocopy the 
work in accordance with its own system. This alternative would also 
eliminate any delay in time between a request and the fulfillment 
thereof.72 
Although it is important for the courts to realize the possibility of 
legislative relief, it is not the court's duty to legislate, but rather to 
interpret the law. "It is not only contrary to law but to business ethics 
to appropriate the property of another for one's use without the 
permission of the owner of that property, whatever its nature may 
be.,,73 
It would be irresponsible for the Supreme Court to sieze upon the 
reservation of the Court of Claims and refuse to decide the matter 
because it relates only to the facts of Williams & Wilkins. Libraries all 
over the country have the capacity to, and are, reproducing 
copyrighted works in massive quantities. The courts must not cast the 
burden of a decision of this importance upon a legislature which has 
been unable to cope with the problem statutorily since its inception. A 
final determination of the issue is overdue while the problem 
compounds daily. 
Judith D. 0 'Neill 
70. SENATE SUBCOMM, ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION FROM 1901 TO 1954, S. Res. 53, Study No. I, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1-19 (1960). 
71. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, S. 
Res. 240, Studies No. 14-16, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-134 (1960). 
72. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, PHOTODUPLICATION OF 
COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS BY LIBRARIES, S. Res. 240, Study No. 15, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 
(1960). 
73. Elisha Hanson, response in COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON 
PHOTODUPLICATION OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL BY LIBRARIES, SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
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